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Within the last year, the Obama administration has taken two significant and dramatic 
steps addressing the challenges of climate change and demonstrating a renewed leadership role 
for the US.  First, as a signatory to the Paris climate agreements, the US has stepped forward to 
participate in that global effort after years of recalcitrance.  The US, for example, signed the 
Rio Declaration in 1992 but five years later would not ratify the 1997 Kyoto Protocol.  Now, 
though, the US has reversed course and has reentered the international climate conversation. 
Briefly, on December 12, 2015, meeting in Paris under the auspices of the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 195 nations, including the US, agreed to 
what has been hailed as an historic climate agreement.1  The agreement was recognized as a 
“turning point, that this is the moment we finally determined we would save our planet” 
and that the assembled nations “share a sense of urgency about this challenge and a growing 
realization that it is within our power to do something about it.”2  Then, on  Earth Day April 
22, 2016, 175 countries, again joined by the US,  became signatories to the agreement3 pledging 
to reduce carbon emissions with the intent of keeping global warming below 2°C while 
pursuing the more ambitious target of limiting temperature increases to 1.5°C from pre-
industrial levels. Although the short 11-page agreement does not set legally binding emissions 
limits, the parties committed themselves to a regime that requires them to report on the 
                                                 
1 Coral Davenport, Nations Approve Landmark Climate Accord in Paris, N.Y. TIMES (December 12, 2015). 
2 White House, Remarks by President Obama at the First Session of COP21 (November 30, 2015) available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/30/remarks-president-obama-first-session-cop21. 
3 United Nations, Sustainable Development Goal:, List of Parties That Signed the Paris Agreement on 22 April 
available at http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2016/04/parisagreementsingatures/. 
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progress of their commitments every five years beginning in 2020.4 
The second significant climate initiative came on the domestic front as the Obama 
administration issued its Clean Power Plan (CPP), which promises to transform US energy 
policy and facilitate the ongoing transition to a clean power economy.  Indeed, President Obama 
has called the CPP “the biggest, most important step we’ve ever taken to combat climate 
change.”5 His administration has now committed the federal government to engaging this  global 
problem.  I must hasten to add, though, it has done so not without substantial and ongoing legal 
and political opposition. 
It is important to recognize the extent to which the new EPA rule affects the electricity 
industry and its regulation.  On June 14, 2014, the EPA publicized proposed rules for the CPP.  
A little over one year later, on October 23, 2015, final rules were published in the Federal 
Register thus making them the official law of the land.6  The rules are complex; they are directed 
to reducing emissions from existing electric power plants, particularly coal-fired facilities; and 
they cover the entire country. The scope of the CPP is broad, its provisions are many, and the 
legal challenges are substantial.7   
Curiously, perhaps, the CPP has been issued not by the Department of Energy (DOE) but 
by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The fact that the EPA, the country’s leading 
environmental agency, has promulgated what are essentially energy regulations, demonstrates 
the complexity of, as well as the challenges facing, US energy/environmental policy and politics.  
By way of example, in the first instance, the EPA has legal responsibility for clean air 
regulations8 including those involve carbon dioxide emissions.9  Consequently, the agency 
should address climate change as part of its clean air mandate.  In the second instance, however, 
the EPA does not have responsibility for energy policy, yet the CPP directly targets coal-fired 
power plants because they account for 37% of the carbon dioxide emitted in the US.  The EPA’s 
entrance into the energy sector is unusual because most energy policy, at the federal level, is 
conducted by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), an agency housed within the 
DOE. Adding a further complication, electricity generation is also regulated by the several states 
each with their own power needs and with their own distinctive energy resource bases that are 
used to generate electricity.  
                                                 
4 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Paris Agreement, FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 
(December 12, 2015) available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf.  
5 Coral Davenport & Gardiner Harris, Obama to Unveil Tougher Climate Plan With His Legacy in Mind, N.Y. 
TIMES 1 (August 2, 2015). 
6 Environmental Protection Agency, Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: 
Electric Generating Units; Final Rule, 80 FED. REG. 64661(2015) (FINAL RULE). 
7 WILLIAM W. BUZBEE ET AL., THE CLEAN POWER PLAN: ISSUES TO WATCH (2015) (a report for the Center for 
Progressive Reform); Emily Hammond & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Clean Power Plan: Testing the Limits of 
Administrative Law and the Electric Grid, _______________ (forthcoming 2016).  
8 The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §7401 et seq. (1970). 
9 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (US Supreme Court held that the EPA has the legal authority and 
responsibility for regulating carbon dioxide as an air pollutant).   
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Of most immediate concern, though, is that the CPP is now in legal limbo. On February 
9, 2016, the United States Supreme Court issued an order to the EPA ruling that the CPP 
could not go forward; in legalese, those regulations were “stayed.”10 The order was a 5-4 
decision that included Justice Scalia in the majority one week before his death leaving his 
seat on the Court vacant.  Justice Scalia’s vote is decidedly significant not only because he 
voted to stay the CPP but, all bets are, he would have voted against it if and when the case 
reaches Supreme Court.11  Most notably, the order staying a government agency from doing 
its job was unprecedented. At no time in its history had the Supreme Court stopped an 
agency from carrying out its constitutional obligations while litigation was pending.  
To be sure the CPP has its defenders as well as its detractors and the Plan is subject to 
continuing litigation as arguments about its legality were heard in June 2016 in the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.12  Given the highly unusual 
nature of the Supreme Court’s stay, however, even after the lower court issues its opinion, 
the legality of the CPP remains an open question. Either way the Court of Appeals rules, it is 
likely that a further appeal to the US Supreme Court will occur while the stay remains in 
place.  
Regardless of the legal outcome from either the lower court or the Supreme Court, the 
significance of the CPP for a successful transition to a clean power economy must be 
underscored.   Simply from the fact that the EPA rather than Department of Energy (DOE) 
issued the CPP, a connection between environmental and energy policy, specifically for the 
purpose of attending to climate change, has been undertaken by the federal government and that 
connection promises to align federal energy policy with environmental goals in unprecedented 
ways. Energy and environmental regulators, as well as affected industries, would be, at the least, 
unwise and more likely negligent to ignore this signal. Moreover, this announcement of federal 
policy simply joins other initiatives taken by the states and by private markets interested in 
furthering the transition to a clean power economy.  Going forward, future national energy policy 
must recognize the environmental consequences of the fuel cycle especially the harmful costs of 
the pollutants emitted during their burning and disposal.  Future energy policy must also 
recognize that renewable resources and energy efficiency must be essential elements in the 
country’s energy mix. 
The linkage between energy and the environment may well be the most lasting legacy of 
the CPP.  Yet, the significance of these rules go beyond connecting the two.  The CPP can 
change the US energy paradigm, and with it, the US energy economy in two notable ways. First, 
the CPP signals a transition away from our traditional fossil fuel energy economy to a clean 
power economy thus joining the several efforts already operating in Europe. Second, the CPP 
                                                 
10 Chamber of Commerce, et al., v. EPA, et al., 577 U.S. __ (February 9, 2016) available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/020916zr3_hf5m.pdf.   
11 See e.g. Lisa Heinzerling, The Power Canons, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. __ (2016). 
12 State of West Virginia, et al. v. EPA, et. al. Docket No. 15-01363 (D.C. Cir Oct. 13, 2015).    
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recognizes that the basic assumption of traditional energy policy – that there was a direct and 
positive correlation between energy production and consumption and economic growth – is no 
longer operative for a developed country like the US.  Our energy economy, the industries that 
sustain it, and the consumers that use it, can prosper with less energy consumption per capita 
rather than with ever increasing energy production.  In fact, the US has been experiencing 
increases in energy efficiency for decades now as we consume less energy for each dollar of 
gross domestic product that is spent.13 
 The most significant aspect of the CPP is the federal recognition that not only has the 
country been experiencing a transition to a clean power economy but that transition must be 
accelerated and can be done economically with cleaner energy resources. The energy transition 
can increase productivity by adopting efficiency measures, financing renewable energy, 
developing alternative fuels and vehicles, and encouraging utilities and their regulators to adapt 
to new business realities.14  In these ways, the CPP can be a positive force that promotes 
technological innovation, creates new energy markets with new energy entrants, and encourages 
federal and state regulatory reforms to encourage and support the transition to a clean power 
future. 
 The promises of a clean power future are many and the US, as well as many other 
countries, are moving precisely in that direction.  It is the intent of this paper, then, to highlight 
the most significant aspect of the CPP which is the alignment of energy and environmental law, 
policy, and regulation.  The alignment, however, will encounter significant challenges that must 
be understood.  Those challenges can best be understood by examining: (1) the relationship 
between energy law and policy and environmental law and policy as it has developed over the 
last four decades; (2) the predominant regulatory method utilized by each discipline; and (3) the 
political and legal frameworks within which they operate.  This paper will discuss each of these 
elements in turn. 
 
The Awkward Relationship between Modern Energy Law and Environmental Law  
The disciplines of US environmental law and energy law, in the forms that we know 
them today were largely developed in the 1970s. Both disciplines were governed by 
predecessor legal regimes and it is not inaccurate to say that both were born from specific 
crises.  
Contemporary environmental law emerged from an historic socio-political cultural 
moment often referred to as “the sixties.” The 1960s in the US, as well as in other countries 
                                                 
13 US ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, MONTHLY ENERGY REVIEW 16 (June 2015). 
14 CENTER FOR THE NEW ENERGY ECONOMY, POWERING FORWARD: PRESIDENTIAL AND EXECUTIVE AGENCY 
ACTIONS TO DRIVE CLEAN ENERGY IN AMERICA 1 (2014). 
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of Europe, experienced profound transitions many of which we are living with today.  Of the 
several social and political movements for which that decade is recognized, such as the civil 
rights and the women’s movements, the environmental movement was a significant strand in 
that history.  
The story of environmentalism has been told other times and a key part of that history 
is that public consciousness was raised about the many ways in which anthropogenic 
behavior harms, and in many instances, destroys the environment.15  While many of the key 
texts giving rise to the environmental movement were popularized during the early 1960s, 
that consciousness was brought into sharper focus in 1969 with a major oil spill off the coast 
of Santa Barbara, California that, in turn, led to the passage of significant environmental 
laws, most notably the National Environmental Policy Act and associated legislation, in 
1970.16 As history shows, though, prior to this legislation, federal and state legislation was 
enacted to promote resource conservation, wilderness protection, and the creation of national 
parks all addressing the nation’s environmental concerns.  
 Contemporary energy law was also generated by a crisis – the 1973 energy crisis 
caused by the Arab oil embargo. To be sure, the embargo, similar to the California oil spill, 
brought other tensions to a head thus generating specific national legislative responses. In the 
case of energy, the driving tension then, as now, was oil. More specifically, the overriding 
concern was weakening domestic oil production with corresponding increases in imports.  
Prior to 1973, the US began to focus on the matter of energy independence. More 
particularly, the country became concerned about the growing role played by foreign oil 
producers, most particularly Middle East oil countries, in global oil markets. In the mid-
1950s, domestic production was insufficient to satisfy domestic demand and oil imports 
began, first slowly, then in earnest. In order to protect domestic oil producers, the 
Eisenhower administration passed legislation in 1959 known as the Mandatory Oil Import 
Quota Program which, as its name indicates, capped cheap oil imports specifically for the 
purpose of propping up prices for domestic oil firms. In retaliation to the quota, the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries was created which exercised its oligopoly 
power to set global oil prices until recently. Later, in 1970, US domestic oil production 
peaked and imports grew annually thus exacerbating concerns over imported oil.  
 In 1973, Middle East oil countries were angered by US support for Israel during the 
Arab-Israeli war of that year.  In retaliation, OPEC tightened the spigot on oil flowing to the 
United States and those restrictions severely damaged the US economy. Briefly, the price of 
                                                 
15 See e.g. Jedediah Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Climate Change, Environmental Law, and Democracy, 119 
YALE L. J. 1122 (2010); RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2004); RICHARD N.L. 
ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING OURSELVES: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (2d ed. 2006). 
16 National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §4321 et seq.; The Clean Air Act of 1970, see also the Clean 
Water Act of 1972. 
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oil quadrupled and, together with other economic dislocations such as Vietnam War 
expenditures, the United States experienced double-digit inflation; consumers waited in gas 
lines to fill their cars; and the economy flattened.  The ability of foreign countries to so 
dramatically impact the domestic economy was the energy crisis that focused the country’s 
attention on the need for independence from foreign, particularly Middle East, oil.  The 
political response was the enactment of major energy legislation starting with President 
Nixon imposing price controls on the oil industry as part of a set of price controls on the 
general economy. Following price controls, legislation was specifically designed to reduce 
oil imports, first by shifting to coal rather than oil for electricity generation and then by a 
whole range of other energy measures. 
 Energy regulation became more focused during the Carter administration with the 
passage of the National Energy Act of 197817 and the Energy Security Act of 1980.18 Both 
acts consisted of several different bills addressing the regulation of oil, coal, electricity, 
nuclear power, energy taxation, and alternative energy forms among other issues.  This 
legislation was President Carter’s attempt at the comprehensive and coordinated regulation 
of energy resources and markets.  While the bills did give rise to the discipline of energy 
law,19 energy regulation was neither coordinated nor comprehensive.20 
Like modern environmental law, energy law had a variety of predecessors. 
Unsurprisingly, energy regulation tracked technological innovations.  From the middle to the 
end of the 19th century, for example, both the oil and electricity industries were largely 
unregulated.  Parenthetically, natural gas regulation later became a national concern in the 
1920s and 1930s. Technological improvements, however, modernized oil pipelines and 
electricity transmission with the consequence that both oil and electricity could travel further 
distances. Additionally, the transportation segments of both industries were perceived to be 
natural monopolies. The ability to move energy resources over longer distances together with 
each industry’s network characteristics, enabled oil and electricity companies to consolidate. 
And, it was that consolidation that gave rise to early energy regulations.  The ability of 
energy firms to exercise market power led to local utility regulation followed by state 
regulation and then, as transportation moved into interstate commerce, to federal regulation. 
                                                 
17 The National Energy Act of 1978 consisted of: the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, Pub. L. No. 95–617; 
the Energy Tax Act,  Pub. L. No. 95–618; the National Energy Conservation Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95–619; the 
Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act, Pub. L. No, 95–620; and the Natural Gas Policy Act  Pub. L. No. 95–621. 
18 The Energy Security Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-294. 
19 See e.g. Fred Bosselman, A Brief History of Energy Law in United States Law Schools: An Introduction to 
the Symposium, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (2010). 
20 See e.g. LINCOLN L. DAVIES & JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, ENERGY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 29-40 
(2015).  
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In the electricity industry, public utility laws, to some extent,21 checked the market 
power of increasingly larger investor owned electric utilities (IOUs).  The oil industry 
encountered another problem that called for government regulation – overabundance. Large 
oilfields were discovered in various parts of the United States and with a rapid increase of 
supply, the cost of oil plummeted from roughly 2 dollars a barrel to a nickel a barrel at the 
turn of the 20th century. The rush to produce drove prices down to unsustainable levels thus 
pushing states to regulate the oil industry through oil and gas conservation laws such as 
unitization and proration.  In short, those laws were designed to reduce the incentive to bring 
as much oil and gas out of the ground as quickly as possible.22 Through these laws, oil 
supplies were controlled and prices were stabilized. 
It should be seen, then, that energy law and environmental law developed differently 
because they were driven by distinct concerns. Additionally, the disciplines adopted distinct 
perspectives about regulation. Energy law is the quintessential example of economic 
regulation, which attempts to control market power abuses and promote competition. 
Environmental law, by contrast, is a quintessential example of social regulation, which 
attempts to promote public goods such as clean air, water and land as well as preserve 
ecological systems and species. These different worldviews have been embedded in the 
regulatory structures that surround each field. Furthermore, to date, these worldviews have 
not been seen as complementary and to the extent that they do fail to complement each other, 
then they may slow the clean energy transition. 
 
The Current and Future Regulatory State  
At various times in US history, the regulatory state and the administrative agencies 
within it, have achieved notable beneficial results. Air and water are cleaner, species are 
preserved, workplaces and food are safer, and the safety record of airlines and nuclear power 
plants is positive.23   Government regulation, then, can be seen to have performed well. 
Nevertheless, the regulatory problems that we must now confront have changed, sometimes 
in extraordinarily dramatic ways, thus necessitating changes in the structure and the policy 
assumptions behind the principles of the regulatory state.  
                                                 
21 Public utility laws cannot be said to have been enacted purely in the public or consumer interest. As 
described below, these laws granted public utilities effective monopolies.  Consequently, regulated utilities 
were virtually guaranteed a return on their investment and they were protected from competition. 
22 JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY: A PRELUDE TO CLIMATE CHANGE ch. 1 (2011); 
LINCOLN L. DAVIES & JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, ENERGY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 143-53 (2015). 
23 See e.g. Robert Weissman, The Obama Administrations Regulatory War on Jobs, the Economy, and 
America's Global Competitiveness, TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON REGULATORY REFORM, 
COMMERCIAL AND ANTITRUST LAW U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (February 28, 2013) available at 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/weissman-regulation-testimony-feb-2013.pdf.  
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More precisely, current energy/environmental regulation has three notable 
deficiencies. First, the traditional regulatory method operates too narrowly.  The traditional 
method is reactive rather than proactive; it pays attention to past events rather than plans for 
the future; and it focuses on specific problems rather than on systemic fixes.  Second, energy 
and environmental regulation occur in disciplinary silos. And, third, each discipline operates 
within its own legal and political frame. As a result of all of these deficiencies, the current 
structure of energy/environmental regulation is insufficient to address climate change. On a 
more hopeful note, the CPP, at the very least, exposes these deficiencies and suggests a 
positive way forward.  
Traditional Regulatory Method and Its Limitations 
The archaeology of the American administrative state reveals several layers. It is notable, 
though, that despite the neoliberal rhetoric about free markets and minimal or no government, 
that the United States has had an administrative apparatus since its founding.24  At that time, the 
administrative reach was limited although the central government did adopt a mercantilist policy 
through a centralized monetary program facilitated through trade tariffs and the National Bank. 
Unfortunately, the National Bank was susceptible to abuse and corruption which led to the Bank 
becoming a target of populist critique, which, in turn, resulted in an anti-government attitude and 
a laissez-faire politics in the 1820s. 
  
Following the Jacksonian laissez-faire period in the mid-18th century, Progressive Era 
agencies were established as a countervailing weight to the concentration of power and influence 
among a few persons and their corporations that resulted from the Industrial Revolution. These 
agencies, which are frequently referred to as the first “modern administrative agencies,” adopted 
specific organizational characteristics discussed below.   
  
The general view is that modern administrative law and policy began late in the 19th 
century with the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act and the creation of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (ICC).25  The now defunct ICC was specifically instituted to combat 
consolidation in the railroad industry. Railroad owners, as well as major shippers such as 
Rockefeller’s Oil Trust, were able to manipulate prices specifically for the purpose of 
eliminating competition. In response, the federal agency was established to check that market 
power.  The Progressive model was both resilient and adaptable and was used extensively during 
                                                 
24 See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1878-
1801, 115 YALE L. J. 1186 (2006); Jerry Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists: Federal Administration and 
Administrative Law in the Republican Era, 1801-1829, 116 YALE L. J. 1636 (2007); Jerry Mashaw, 
Administration & “The Democracy”: Administrative Law from Jackson to Lincoln, 1829-1861, 117 YALE L. J. 
1586 (2008); Jerry Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Gilded Age, 119 YALE L. J. 
1362 (2010). 
25 See e.g. SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, ACHIEVING DEMOCRACY: THE FUTURE OF PROGRESSIVE 
REGULATION 24-27 (2014). 
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the New Deal in the 1930s specifically for broad-based economic regulation.  During the New 
Deal, agencies proliferated as society grew more complex and as the country uncovered more 
social and economic problems that needed to be corrected.  
 
New Deal agencies retained a similar organizational form as those established at the end 
of the 19th century. They were established to address an identified problem through the 
application of technical expertise.  Instead of functioning as intended, though, both regulators 
and their regulated entities adopted similar structural characteristics and grew dependent upon 
one another.  Regulators needed information and expertise from the industries that they regulated 
and, in return, the regulated firms expected some protection from and assurances against what 
they perceived to be unwarranted competition from new entrants.  Regulators, in other words, 
helped sustain the very industries and firms that they were ostensibly “regulating.” In short, the 
regulator-regulatee relationship was susceptible to, and not infrequently resulted in, capture.26 
 
This traditional approach to regulation was further entrenched in 1947 when Congress 
passed the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).  The APA was intended to bring order to the 
various procedures used by the welter of administrative agencies that had been created during the 
New Deal by rationalizing and formalizing agency action.  The basic idea behind the APA was 
that all agencies should more or less follow similar procedures with judicial review available for 
their failure to do so.  The Act was supported by regulated industries that saw it as a way to cabin 
agency discretion and, concomitantly, reduce the cost of what they perceived to be cumbersome 
regulations.  
 
Lyndon Johnson’s presidency produced another set of administrative agencies in the 
1960s, which differed from those established during the New Deal.  Johnson’s Great Society 
programming shifted regulation away from a concentration on economic regulation to 
encompass social regulation.27  Public interest and environmental advocates grew distrustful of 
government.  They perceived a pattern of regulatory capture by those industries that were 
ostensibly controlled by economic regulation.  As an antidote to that capture, not only did these 
new agencies focus on social issues they also considered, and adopted, an interest representation 
model of regulation, an adjustment captured in Richard Stewart’s iconic article, “The 
Reformation of American Administrative Law.”28   
 
The interest representation model was intended to ensure that citizens and consumers 
would have more input into the regulatory process, which was increasingly involved in the 
economic, political, and social dimensions of their lives. Stewart predicted correctly that the 
                                                 
26 See generally DANIEL CARPENTER & DAVID A. MOSS (eds.), PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL 
INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT (2013). 
27 See e.g. RANDALL B. WOODS, PRISONERS OF HOPE: LYNDON B. JOHNSON, THE GREAT SOCIETY, AND THE 
LIMITS OF LIBERALISM (2016). 
28 Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975). 
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interest representation model would fail. His argument was that there were collective action 
problems that would prevent effective participation by citizens in the regulatory state.  His 
prediction was accurate as far as it goes; it is often prohibitively costly for citizens to organize 
and be heard in the halls of Congress or in agency hearing rooms.  Stewart did not, however, 
foresee how politicized (and impaired) the regulatory state would become through the 
intervention of a neoliberal ideology that extolled “free markets” and attacked regulation at every 
turn.  Anti-regulation zealotry was based upon the idea that all regulations killed jobs and 
retarding economic growth.  Ironically, perhaps, one way to slow down the regulatory state was 
to encumber it through more regulations thus “ossifying” the regulatory process.29  Additional 
regulatory reviews and requirements for cost-benefit analyses, as examples, added layers of, and 
costs to, regulation, while other anti-regulatory tactics consisted of under enforcement and 
underfunding agencies.  
 
 Aside from such politicization of agency action, when the traditional administrative 
agency operated as intended, it functioned fairly well and was adapted to the time.  Briefly, 
regulatory methodology was a two or three step process. First, a problem was identified and 
second, a regulatory tool was applied to correct it. The occasional third step would consist of 
assessing and evaluating the success or failure of the regulation itself.  Agencies, thus, were 
designed to address an identified problem through the rational application of technical 
expertise by the analysis and application of empirical data. Also, agencies were to be neutral 
and nonpolitical.  It must be emphasized, however, that such a methodology was 
retrospective. The agency would look backward to identify and understand problems rather 
than looking forward to anticipate them.    
As time passed and as industry influence increased, these expert, technical 
bureaucrats found themselves in silos that addressed legislatively targeted  issues often with 
little or no attention paid to coordination with other related problems. Moreover, they 
became increasingly dependent on industry for the information and other resources such as 
expert experience needed to do their jobs. This narrow, backwards-looking and subject-
specific focus is what Professor William Simon called the preoccupation of canonical 
administrative law.30 
The traditional regulatory model was based on faith in technocratic expertise; on  reliance 
on neutrality and objectivity; and on the belief that administrative agencies could carry out the 
will of the legislature without political interference. Consequently, such an apolitical view of the 
                                                 
29 See e.g. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rule-Making Ossification is Real: A Response to Testing the Ossification 
Thesis, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1493 (2012); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying: the 
Rulemaking Process, 1992 DUKE L. REV. 1463.  
30 William Simon, Democracy and Organization: The Further Reformation of American Administrative Law 
(November 12, 2012) available at 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/256039761_Democracy_and_Organization_The_Further_Reformatio
n_of_American_Administrative_Law. 
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role of administrative agencies led to a jurisprudence of deference to agency decision-making by 
the judiciary. 
 
Today, however, continued faith in that model goes wanting as the traditional model has 
been eroding for decades. More pointedly, the culprit for that erosion is politics.  Politics, of 
course, is in the eye of the beholder.  Critics on the left as well as on the right argue that the 
model no longer holds. Those on the right prefer a more activist judiciary to check what they 
believe to be abuses of administrative discretion.31 Those on the left argue that the judiciary has 
simply gone too far and that agencies should have the discretion to carry out the will of Congress 
as expressed in the legislation that guides them without additional requirements imposed by the 
judiciary such as close cost-benefit scrutiny.32 
 
For purposes of discussing the current state of energy/environmental policy, however, the 
point here is a narrow one. The model of the traditional US administrative agency, as well as the 
regulatory methods that it employs, are deficient.  Those deficiencies are compounded by 
regulatory silos and affective legal and political frameworks within which agencies and their 
regulated industries operate.  
 
Regulatory Silos 
The regulation of energy and the regulation of the environment are contained within 
two different sets of silos.  First, energy and the environment are regulated separately and 
independently from each other.  Second, each discipline contains its own internal set of silos. 
Within the discipline of environmental regulation, for example, water, air, and species are 
subject to distinct statutory regimes and are regulated by different bureaus and sometimes 
different departments within an agency. Similarly, public lands and private lands are treated 
independently of each other and, depending upon ownership, some lands fall within the 
jurisdiction of the Department of Interior or the EPA while some tribal issues are handled by 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs.  
Similarly, different energy resources are regulated by different bureaus or 
departments as well. Oil, natural gas, electricity, coal, nuclear power and hydropower, are 
also governed by different statutes and regulated by different agencies. For example, 
although FERC has responsibility for regulating the interstate transmission of electricity, 
natural gas and oil, each resource is regulated separately from each other.33 Further 
complicating the regulation of energy resources, some resources are treated by multiple 
agencies. Interstate nuclear generated electricity is regulated by FERC; the safety, 
                                                 
31 See e.g. Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The “Reformation of Administrative Law” Revisited, 31 
J. LAW, ECON. &  ORG. 782 (2105). 
32 See e.g. Heinzerling, supra note11. 
33 See e.g. Alexandra B. Klass & Danielle Meinhardt, Transporting Oil and Gas: U.S. Infrastructure 
Challenges, 100 IOWA L. REV. 947 (2105). 
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construction and licensing of nuclear power plants are regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, and retail sales of nuclear generated electricity are regulated by state public 
utilities commissions. This fragmentation of regulation occurs throughout the energy sector. 
The separate treatment for energy and environmental resources is consistent with the 
historic development of administrative agencies and with their traditional regulatory 
methodologies. Like other regulatory problems, energy and environmental regulation occurs 
retrospectively.  Once an energy or an environmental problems is identified, then it can be 
addressed through problem-specific regulation. Further, separate treatment makes sense (as 
far as this method goes) and is also consistent with the traditional approach to regulation. 
After all, each area has its own complexities and each requires specific technocratic fixes. By 
treating resources in those silos, however, coordination is lacking. Compounding this narrow 
view are the distinct legal and political frames within which each discipline is perceived and 
regulated. 
Legal and Political Frames34  
Given the regulatory framework just outlined; the institutional development of energy 
law and environmental law as independent disciplines; and the regulatory silos in which 
energy and environmental regulation operate, it is not surprising that each discipline has 
developed its own legal and political frame. 
 Each discipline has developed its own perspective of the political economy with its own 
set of goals and perspectives. These separate viewpoints create different and separate narratives, 
which have the effect of creating different and separate policy programs as well as different 
political agendas.  However, the separation of energy and the environment is a false binary35 that 
must be rejected.  Energy and the environment are not separate realms of natural physical 
behavior; they are two sides of the same coin and, therefore, it is better and more accurate to 
consider the energy/environmental complex rather than to treat them independently of each 
other. Consequently, the political assessment of the energy/environmental complex, and the laws 
and policies attendant to that assessment, must be considered as a whole.  Regardless, separate 
legal and political frames have been adopted as demonstrated by their separate languages and 
vocabularies. 
The language of the environment is about conservation, species protection, ecological 
sensitivity, and precaution. The language of energy is about production, consumption, jobs, and, 
most importantly, economic growth.  Both languages, though, are too narrow; each misses 
important aspects of the other. The language of the environment is too insensitive to economic 
growth, technological advances, and general consumer lifestyles. The language of energy is too 
                                                 
34 See Joseph P. Tomain, A Perspective on Clean Power and the Future of US Energy Politics and Policy, 39 
UTIL. POLICY 5 (2015).  
35 See e.g. Purdy, supra note15 at 1189. 
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insensitive to the commons, too reliant on “free markets,” and too defensive about incumbent 
fossil fuel and nuclear energy firms while less attentive to new clean energy entrants. This is not 
to say that these issues are ignored altogether by one language or the other; rather, it is to say, 
though, that one language often downplays and, at times, obscures, the other as a result of path 
dependent political frames that have divided energy and the environment into separate spheres.   
These two languages simply pay inadequate attention to the reality of the energy fuel 
cycle. From the environmental side, the energy narrative tends to downplay, if not ignore, the 
environmental effects that occur from exploration and extraction through production and 
transportation to consumption and disposal.  Simply, the natural resources we use to produce 
energy, particularly carbon heavy resources, impose identifiable and often serious social and 
economic costs.  From the energy side, the environmental narrative tends to downplay, if not 
ignore, the costs of doing business such as the sunk costs of past investments, the transition costs 
of moving from one energy paradigm to another, and the possibility of lost opportunity costs 
available under current business practices. 
Consider further that the two languages do not appear to merge well – a circumstance that 
must be overcome. The fears and frustrations of environmentalists with free market rhetoric; the 
anguished application of cost-benefit analyses; the distortion of science;36 and, skepticism that 
technological advances can be relied upon to solve climate challenges may overstate fears about 
the future and sound apocalyptic. The fears and frustrations from the energy sector about low or 
no economic growth; wariness about soft variables such as fairness and environmentalism; and, 
the loss of the incumbents’ positions in the energy economy may overstate their fears about the 
future, sound faintly Luddite, and appear unwilling to tackle change or experiment with and 
adopt new business models.37 
Such fears, on both sides, are not irrational because those fears tap into the deepest 
commitments of both narratives. In brief, the energy narrative is about efficiency and our 
immediate and near-term economic well-being.  The environmental narrative is about the long-
term interconnectedness of the human and natural environments.  The energy narrative also 
expresses a deep concern about our political and economic status in the world.  The 
environmental narrative also expresses a deep concern about the future of the planet.38 And, 
finally, the energy narrative is explicitly instrumental because energy is simply a means to the 
                                                 
36 See e.g. Justin Gillis & John Schwartz, Deeper Ties to Corporate Case for Doubtful Climate Researcher, 
N.Y. TIMES (February 21, 2015); Terrence McCoy, Fla. Scientist Told to Remove Words “Climate Change” 
from Study on Climate Change, WASH. POST (March 10, 2015).  
37 See generally TED NORDHAUS & MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER, THE END OF ENVIRONMENTALISM: FROM THE 
DEATH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM TO THE POLITICS OF POSSIBILITY (2007).  The authors, together with their 
Breakthrough Institute, attempt to merge energy and the environment with an explicitly pro-growth agenda. 
(“The transition to a clean-energy economy should be modeled not on pollution control efforts, like the one on 
acid rain, but rather on past investments in infrastructure, such as railroads and highways, as well as on 
research and development – microchips, medicines, and the Internet, among other areas." At 15.) 
38 See e.g. Sarah Krakoff, Parenting the Planet in DENIS G. ARNOLD (ed.), THE ETHICS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE 145 (2014); Purdy, supra note 15at 1174-80.  
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end of economic productivity.  In turn, the environmental narrative often sounds explicitly 
intrinsic as environmental protection is discussed as a good in and of itself.  Nevertheless, it is 
incumbent upon us to adopt a new approach to energy and the environment and one that merges 
the hopes and promises, as well as the concerns and fears, of both narratives into a consistent and 
convergent39 whole.   
 
Meeting the Regulatory Future 
 
The three deficiencies of traditional regulation just discussed indicate that the current 
legal and regulatory regime is inadequate to meet the energy/environmental future.  In a 
changing and more populous world, the environmental/energy problems that we confront cannot 
be adequately addressed by our current administrative structure with its focus on specific areas.  
Nor can that future be addressed by the narrow political frames just discussed.  Instead, and most 
notably, policymakers must recognize that climate change has a different and more complex 
configuration than traditional regulatory problems and that it is the paradigmatic example of 
Richard Lazarus calls a “super wicked problem.”40  Climate change present challenges that are 
multidisciplinary, transgenerational, transboundary, multijurisdictional, and contain an array of 
technical and economic uncertainties and complexities that can have catastrophic consequences 
if left unattended.41 Traditional administrative agencies and law might have worked well to solve 
a past problem, but today’s energy/environmental challenges require multilevel and flexible 
anticipatory problem solving, something that is difficult to achieve within today’s entrenched 
regulatory structure. 
 
Instead of a simple ex post market fix, the new energy/environmental regulatory regime 
must behave differently.  Addressing climate change and clean power will require high degrees 
of ex ante planning and coordination, more sophisticated computer modeling and analyses, and a 
set of principles and goals that can be continuously monitored, evaluated, and corrected as 
needed.  Agencies and bureaus tasked with implementing the CPP and associated regulations, 
will need to address cross-cutting energy and environmental problems in coordinated ways rather 
than separately. Additionally, the new regulatory structure must engage in continuous 
assessment, improvement, and learning as CPP regulation is implemented. Recall, the CPP will 
be administered by the states and, therefore, the states can play the Brandesian role of 
laboratories for regulatory experiments.42 
                                                 
39 See e.g. ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2009).   
40 Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change; Restraining the Present to Liberate the 
Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153 (2009). 
41 See e.g. RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE (2004); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WORST-CASE 
SCENARIOS (2009); W. Kip Viscusi & Richard Zeckhauser, Addressing Catastrophic Risk, in  REGULATORY 
BREAKDOWN: THE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN U.S. REGULATION 21 (Cary Conglianese ed. 2012). 
42 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmnan, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (Brandeis, J. dissenting) 
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The appropriate regulatory approach will be progressive and will address these super-
wicked problems; account for the current level of capture; move beyond New Deal-Great Society 
regulatory silos; and embrace the role of government as a positive contributor to society. The 
current model of agencies results in a bureaucratic culture notably influenced by the “tendency of 
political actors to focus on short-term goals and consequences and . . . their reluctance to threaten 
the existing business models of powerful incumbent actors.”43  Properly responding to climate 
change will challenge old institutional designs and institute new ones; adopt reliable metrics; 
promote experiment and innovation; and will be driven by concern for the long-term 
improvement of the environment through a transition to a clean power and away from a 
traditional fossil fuel paradigm. The CPP, then, present an opportunity to reinvent the regulatory 
state.  
 
Clean Power Plan 
 The Clean Power Plan, then, has potential for bridging the two separate disciplines of 
energy and the environment.  Given the extensive history of both disciplines, the administrative 
structures supporting them, and the industry’s that rely upon them, the merger will not be 
seamless. Nevertheless, we can identify some advantages while also acknowledging forthcoming 
challenges. 
 The proposed CPP seeks to reduce carbon emissions by 26% (below 2005 levels) by 
2020 and by 32% by 2030.  The EPA estimates that the annual total combined climate and health 
benefits from adopting the CPP range from $3.5 billion to $8.1 billion in 2020 and from $34 
billion to $48 billion in 2030.44  These benefits include reduced risks from heat stroke, heat-
related deaths, and reduced particulate pollution, as well as the benefits incident to a decrease in 
the intensity of extreme weather events.  EPA also envisions emissions reductions of sulfur 
dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and fine particular matters.  Further, the agency estimates that the 
health and climate benefits will outweigh the estimated annual cost of meeting the standards, 
which are projected to run from $5.1 billion to $8.4 billion in 2030.45 
EPA will establish overall goals for each state, and then states will have leeway to craft 
compliance plans.  Each state must first meet an interim carbon reduction goal then must meet 
EPA’s 2030 target for emission reductions, and continue to do so from that point onward.  State 
goals will be tethered to EPA’s calculation of the “best system of emissions reduction” (BSER). 
 
                                                 
43 Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1, 13-14 (2008). 
44  FED. REG. 64679-682. 
45  FED. REG. 64679. 
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The BSER will be calculated based upon the mix of the power resources in each state and 
the application of three “building blocks” to achieve reduction targets.  The building blocks are: 
(1) increasing the efficiency of fossil fuel-fired power plants through heat-rate improvements; 
(2) using lower emitting energy resources such as natural gas; and (3) utilizing more zero or low-
carbon energy sources such as renewable energy or nuclear power.  The proposed rule included a 
fourth building block to encourage the deployment of demand response and energy efficiency 
programs. After the public comments, EPA deleted this building block although demand 
response and energy efficiency, as well as retiring coal plants, can be used to satisfy a state’s 
goals under the plan.  
 
 
Aligning Energy and the Environment 
Two significant consequences follow from linking energy regulation and environmental 
regulation. First, a clean energy policy can be designed. Second, the energy future is then linked 
to climate change. It can be argued, easily enough, that a clean energy future is valuable in and 
of itself.  Nevertheless, aligning climate change and clean energy promises a better and more 
sustainable future.  
 
 An energy/environmental future should be based on two ideas.  First, the traditional 
energy narrative has outlived its useful life and is stale. Historically, cheap, but dirty, fossil fuel 
energy has played a significant role in contributing to economic growth and to the political 
authority of the US for most of the 20th century.  In the 21st century, however, the fundamental 
economic assumption of traditional energy policy has proven to be seriously flawed precisely 
because of the unaccounted for social costs of that old fossil fuel policy.  Second, the old model 
of separate and independent energy and environmental regulation is no longer responsive to  
current needs.  
As my forthcoming book, Clean Power Politics argues,46 there are several benefits to 
aligning energy and environmental regulation through the CPP including:  
(1) A New Regulatory Contract.  The standard regulatory contract between the utility and 
its regulators is structured such that public utility commissions (PUCs) have the 
power to set utility rates in exchange for providing utilities with a defined service 
territory. In effect, PUCs control prices and profits while utilities have a monopoly 
within a defined geographic area. A new regulatory contract will continue the practice 
of PUC ratemaking; however, the service territory will have to be redefined to allow 
some competition such as self-generated power through rooftop solar and other 
localized energy sources. 
                                                 
46 JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, CLEAN POWER POLITICS: THE NECESSITY OF INNOVATION (forthcoming Cambridge 
Universilty Press 2016). 
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(2) New Ratemaking Formula. Historically, the regulatory compact has been interpreted 
and applied in such a way that a utility’s rates were based upon the amount of their 
electricity sales. Also known as volumetric rates, through this rate formula, a utility 
was encouraged sell more electricity and, concomitantly, build more plant. In an era 
in which demand for electricity was growing, the traditional formula worked well. 
Now, as energy efficiency gains are being made, a volumetric rate formula is 
counterproductive. Similarly, ratemaking can be designed to encourage energy 
efficiency as well as promote decentralized power use through net metering or 
arrangements that fully account for the benefits that decentralized power provides to 
the local utility. A homeowner who has rooftop solar or owns an electric vehicle, as 
examples, contributes value to the local utility by helping stabilize load. That value 
must be taken into consideration through ratemaking. 
 
 
(3) Dispatch. PUCs are tasked with serving two masters. On the one hand, they view 
their job as supporting local utilities so that affordable universal service is available 
within the utility’s service territory. On the other hand, regulators do not want to 
impose excessive costs on consumers.  Historically, one way to serve both masters 
was to engage in a dispatch practice in which the least cost energy resources were 
used to generate electricity. In the not-too-distant past, the least cost energy resource 
was coal, the dirtiest of fuels. More recently, natural gas is replacing coal, still natural 
gas is a fossil fuel and one that is less benign than its proponents assert.47 This 
dispatch practice, also known as economic dispatch, must be replaced with 
environmental dispatch, which, instead of using the least cost natural resources first, 
uses the lowest carbon resources first.  In the short-term, environmental dispatch  may 
likely raise rates.  However, as energy efficiency measures are more widely adopted, 
rates should lower and stabilize while advancing a clean power agenda. 
 
(4) Clean Power R&D. Energy R&D, most certainly at the federal level, has generally 
lagged behind investments in other sectors such as defense, telecommunications, and 
pharmaceuticals. The Obama administration has ramped up clean power R&D 
through several efforts in the DOE particularly through an entity known as the 
advanced research projects agency (ARPA-E).48  ARPA-E programs engage in 
energy research through national laboratories, public-private consortia, and other 
arrangements. These initiatives encompass a wide range of activities from basic 
science research to technological implementation and market creation. DOE has 
funded an array of projects from fusion research to energy storage and from wind and 
                                                 
4747 See e.g. Joseph P. Tomain, Shale Gas and Clean Energy Policy, 63 CASE WESTERN L. REV. 1187 (2013). 
48 See e.g. ARPA-E homepage at http://arpa-e.energy.gov/?q=arpa-e-site-page/arpa-e-history.  
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solar power to advanced nuclear plant design. At the state level, clean power 
demonstration projects through such as electric vehicle recharging or household clean 
power retrofits, can be funded through ratemaking as a method for financing R&D.  
 
 
(5) Decentralization. Large central power stations have been relied upon for over a 
century to build out infrastructure, provide adequate amounts of reasonably priced 
electricity, and serve all customers. Because of the traditional regulatory compact and 
its implementing ratemaking formula, large central power stations may well have 
reached their most efficient point.  Other than retrofitting existing plants, new plants 
may not necessarily realize continuing economies of scale as utilities have for most of 
the last century. Instead, decentralized power such as small-scale solar and wind, 
micro-grids, energy storage, and other localized power, significantly change the 
large-scale paradigm and democratize energy more than we have seen since the end 
of the 19th century.  
 
(6) Energy Competition. Consistent with the concept of decentralization, as we move 
towards a clean power economy and away from large-scale generation and 
distribution in the electricity sector, there will be an array of new entrants into energy 
markets. New equipment such as solar panels and smart meters; new businesses such 
as energy audits and installations; and new service providers such as independent 
power producers and independent transmission systems add new actors, new services, 
and new products to emerging energy markets thus making the energy sector more 
competitive. The development of new energy markets also entails a switch away from 
capital investment to investment in labor. Decentralized energy services will require 
more labor for installation, monitoring, and customer service thus expanding the job 
market and contributing to economic growth. 
 
 
(7) New Business Models. Most of electricity generated and distributed in the United 
States is done through private IOUs. While a clean power transition promises greater 
decentralization and more competition, those IOUs will, at a minimum, play a 
transitional role. In other words, they will continue to be central and important factors 
in the electricity sector. To maintain their centrality, the smart IOU must develop new 
business models to sustain its financial integrity. The smart IOU, for example, will 
understand that it is in the energy business rather than just the electricity business. In 
other words, instead of basing their revenue on increasing electricity sales, they must 
understand that they have other products and services to offer their customers. The 
smart IOU will broaden its sources of electricity to include clean power, will also 
“sell” energy efficiency, and will have both regulated and unregulated business units. 
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By way of example, an IOU can invest in large-scale solar or wind projects and be 
regulated under the old regime and it can invest in decentralized power sales and 
compete with new entrants in an unregulated environment. 
 
(8) Common Metric. The CPP starts to develop a common metric to be used by energy 
providers as well as by environmental regulators. All aspects of the 
energy/environmental complex must understand the costs of CPP initiatives.  For 
every dollar invested in a CPP project, for example, regulators must understand how 
much energy is generated and at what environmental cost.  It is not unusual for critics 
of the CPP to argue that the CPP will raise the cost of electricity.49 In other words, 
this calculation weighs the costs of CPP energy against the costs of traditional 
electricity. This is a false comparison because the whole point of the CPP is to 
balance the cost of energy projects against the environmental and health costs 
generated by them. The apples-to-apples comparison is between energy costs and 
environmental benefits not between energy costs before and after the initiative. This 
comparison between energy costs and environmental benefits is a move towards 
developing a common metric that links and deepens our understanding of the 
relationship between energy and the environment.  
 
 
(9) Local Governance. Decentralized, small-scale, labor-intensive clean energy industries 
and activities should offer a locality a competitive advantage by stimulating jobs,50 
innovations51 and investments.52  Further, local governments can serve as “policy 
laboratories” that engage in regulatory experimentation, which should promote 
efficiency gains through competition; develop best practices for the local use and 
distribution of energy; engage in public education through the accumulation and 
dissemination of local knowledge; enable localities to scale energy activities to the 
                                                 
49 Jason S. Johnston, The False Federalism of EPA’s Clean Power Plan, Virginia Law and Economics Research 
Paper No. 16 available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2604308## (May 2015); Jim 
Manzi & Pe t e r  Wehner, Conservatives and Climate Change, NATIONAL AFFAIRS 115 (Summer 2015). 
50 See e.g. E2 Environmental Entrepreneurs, Clean Energy Works for US: 2013 Year-in-Review and Q4 Report 
(February 2014); American Council for and Energy-Efficient Economy, How Does Energy Efficiency Create 
Jobs?(undated); Rachel Gold, State by State, Appliance Standards Save Money, Create Jobs, and Protect the 
Environment (May 25, 2011) Casey Bell, Proving Energy Efficiency Creates Jobs: Seeking a New Standard 
Model (January 22, 2014); ACORE, CalCEF &  Climate Policy Initiative, Strategies to Scale-Up U.S. 
Renewable Energy Investment (2013); Environmental and Energy Study Institute, Fact Sheet: Jobs in 
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency  (2014); MCKINSEY GLOBAL ENERGY AND MATERIALS, UNLOCKING 
ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN THE U.S. ECONOMY (July 2009). 
51 See e.g. Sara Hastings-Simon, Dickon Pinner & Martin Stuchtey, Myths and Realities of Clean Technologies 
(April 2014).  
52  REN21, RENEWABLES 2014 GLOBAL STATUS REPORT 72 (2014).   
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tasks most suitable to them; and, search for cooperative solutions with and among 
other layers of government.53  
Given the constraints already expressed about the separate development and regulation of 
these two disciplines, an alignment between them, let alone a full merger will confront multiple 
challenges. Among those challenges is the problem of coordination between and within 
agencies.54 Recall that different energy resources and different environmental resources are 
treated by different departments under different regulatory and statutory regimes. Consequently, 
government officials and policymakers responsible for those various resources have a familiarity 
with the regulation and an alignment between them will require new management, expertise, 
planning, and cooperation.  
Additionally, both energy and environmental law have always been regulated at the 
federal and state levels thus presenting a variety of federalism problems. While the concept of 
cooperative federalism, in which standards are set by the federal government and administered 
by the states, is attractive, it is not problem free.55   
Energy, of course, is a major and significant input into the economy. At roughly 8% of 
GDP, investment in energy production and transportation and other infrastructure represents 
significant sunk costs. Incumbents, then, have not only invested heavily in the sector, they have 
done so in reliance on a regulatory structure with which they become familiar. Regulators, no 
less than regulatees, have also become familiar with the laws and regulations governing 
particular resources and are also familiar with industry actors. In short, incumbents are 
committed to past ways of doing business in order to protect the sunk costs and they are 
protected to a significant degree by the path dependency upon which they rely in their businesses 
and upon which regulators carry out their duties. 
While it would be fanciful to argue that the CPP can easily and smoothly overcome these 
barriers is not fanciful to argue that it starts the process of alignment.  
 
Conclusion   
The US can continue discussing a nuclear renaissance, its increases in domestic oil and 
natural gas production, and/or the potential for clean coal, or it can abandon this old dialogue and 
move to develop a new set of energy and environmental commitments; a set of commitments that 
                                                 
53 Garrick B. Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L. J. 877, 881-82; 933-34 (2011). 
54 See e.g. Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 
1131 (2012); Jennifer Nou,  Intra-agency Coordination, 129 HARV. L. REV. 421 (2015); Bijal Shah, 
Uncovering Coordinated Interagency Adjudication, 128 HARV. L. REV. 805 (2015). 
55 See e.g. Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path of  Energy Federalism, 95 TEX. L. REV. ___(2106); Hari M. 
Osofosky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 MD. L. REV.  773 (2013); Hannah J. 
Wiseman, Moving Past Dual Federalism to Advance the Electric Grid, 100 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 97 (2015) 
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advance the interests of citizen/consumers in the emerging clean energy future.  The choice 
seems obvious as the energy transition moves away from a traditional fossil fuel economy to one 
in which environmental concerns are treated together with our energy demands.  Incumbent 
firms, existing institutions and regulations, and the old energy narrative will continue to 
influence public discussion. Nevertheless, a new narrative is developing that is attentive to 
emerging energy technologies, cognizant of environmental consequences of the fuel cycle, and is 
committed to developing a wider range of energy resources, markets, and participants on both 
the supply and demand sides of the meter.   The CPP, then, promises to be major chapter in that 
new narrative. 
  
 
    
 
 
 
 
